Financial weapons of mass destruction strike again: naked

On October 23, 2008, in the middle of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression, Reuters ran an article entitled: “Greenspan says was ‘partially’ wrong on CDS regulation.”

“Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan acknowledged he was "partially" wrong in his belief that some trading instruments, specifically credit default swaps, did not need regulation.

Henry Waxman, the Democrat who chairs the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, cited a series of public statements by Greenspan saying the market could handle regulation of derivatives without government intervention.

"My question is simple: Were you wrong?" Waxman said.

Greenspan said he was "partially" wrong in the case of credit default swaps, complex trading instruments meant to act as insurance for bond buyers against default.

"I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and the equity," Greenspan said.

When asked by Waxman if his ideology pushed him to make bad decisions, Greenspan said he found a "flaw" in his governing ideology that has led him to reexamine his thinking” (Dixon 2008).

CDS is an acronym for Credit Default Swap, a credit derivative that resembles insurance in that the buyer pays a premium to the seller in order to protect against the default of another entity. The purchaser of a CDS may have an insurable interest in the entity on which CDS’s are being written, by being a creditor or a bondholder, for example, which consequently means that a legitimate interest in protection against default exists, and the purchase of CDS’s can be seen as constituting a hedge, or a way of managing risk. In case the purchaser does not have an insurable interest, however, the purchase of a CDS is termed “naked” and constitutes nothing more than speculation that the entity on which the CDS is written will default. In case of default or a credit event the seller of the CDS has to pay the CDS holder the previously agreed upon sum, as stipulated in the contract. So while this may seem to be a fairly straight-forward insurance-type product, the fact that these instruments are traded OTC, or “over the counter,” however, means that no one really knows who has written how many CDS’s, on whom, for how much, to whom they have been sold, or whether there is any money to pay out in case of a default. This last point came into focus quite clearly when American International Group (AIG) had to be bailed out by the US taxpayer to the tune of over $180 billion in large part because they did not have any money to pay out on the Credit Default Swaps they had written (Sjostrom Jr. 2008).  

As reported by the BBC, back in 2003, when the notional amount of the entire derivatives market was only $85 trillion, Warren Buffet famously likened them to time bombs and “financial weapons of mass destruction,” some of which seemed to have been devised by “madmen,” and the whole derivatives industry was similar to “hell... easy to enter and almost impossible to exit” (BBC 2003). While Buffet did not specify CDS’s at the time, by September 2011, when, as reported by The Bank of International Settlements (BIS 2011), the entire derivatives market had swollen to over $700 trillion and the notional amount of Credit Default Swaps outstanding was still $32 trillion, down from $62 trillion in 2007, the Financial Times had no problem running an article titled:”CDS: modern day weapons of mass destruction.” The article by Chapman (2011) cited a paper by Calice, Chen and Williams (2011) which found that “for several countries including Greece, Portugal and Ireland the liquidity of the sovereign CDS market has a substantial infuence on sovereign debt spreads,” meaning that CDS’s could contribute to rising bond yields and thus push up borrowing costs and increase the risk of default by sovereign countries. Faced with contagion in the Eurozone and a possible cascade of defaults, the German government, on whose shoulders much of the cost of bailing out the periphery falls, demanded a ban on “naked short selling” and, especially, “naked” CDS’s as well (Baker and Peel 2011).

In an article calling for a ban on “naked” CDS’s Wolfgang Münchau (2010) noted that a “naked CDS...is a purely speculative gamble [without even] one social or economic benefit [which is something that] even hardened speculators agree on. [Moreover a] universally accepted aspect of insurance regulation is that you can only insure what you actually own [and not] even the most libertarian extremist would accept that you could take out insurance on your neighbour’s house or the life of your boss,” especially if you proceeded to light a match to the house or push the boss of a cliff, which, after keeping in mind the findings from above, is what the whole thing amounts to. Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy are all facing ruinous borrowing costs in late 2011 and it is utterly uncertain whether the Eurozone will make it through 2012.

Credit Default Swaps are consequently living up to the moniker given derivatives by Warren Buffett: “financial weapons of mass destruction.” Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin and Larry Summers refused to consider regulation of CDS’s back in 1997 when Brooksley Born testified before Congress that trading in unregulated derivatives would "threaten our regulated markets or, indeed, our economy without any federal agency knowing about it" (van den Heuvel 2008). They refused, due to the belief noted above that the self-interest of rational economic agents and organizations would be sufficient to prevent the taking on of too much risk and “was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and the equity.” After admitting that this belief was wrong and that he had found a flaw in his worldview, his ideology, the disciple of Ayn Rand also admitted that: “This modern risk-management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year” (Andrews 2008). We are still dealing with the fallout and should prepare for worse, as reported by zerohedge, who address the meaning and significance of the derivatives market number reported by the BIS being

the biggest ever reported in the financial world: the number in question is $707,568,901,000,000 and represents the latest total amount of all notional Over The Counter (read unregulated) outstanding derivatives...Indicatively, global GDP is about $63 trillion if one can trust any numbers released by modern governments...

for the six month period ended June 30, 2011, the total number of outstanding derivatives surged past the previous all time high of $673 trillion from June 2008, and is now firmly in 7-handle territory: the synthetic credit bubble has now been blown to a new all time high. Another way of looking at the data is that one of the key contributors to global growth and prosperity in the past 10 years was an increase in total derivatives from just under $100 trillion to $708 trillion in exactly one decade. And soon we have to pay the mean reversion price. 

What is probably just as disturbing is that in the first 6 months of 2011, the total outstanding notional of all derivatives rose from $601 trillion at December 31, 2010 to $708 trillion at June 30, 2011. A $107 trillion increase in notional in half a year. 

There is much more than can be said on this topic, and has to be said, because an increase of that magnitude is simply impossible to perceive without alarm bells going off everywhere, especially when one considers the pervasive deleveraging occurring at every sector but the government. All else equal, this move may well explain the massive surge in bank profitability in the first half of the year. It also means that with banks suffering massive losses, and rumors of bank runs and collateral calls, not to mention the aftermath of the MF Global insolvency, the world financial syndicate will have no choice but to increase gross notional even more, even as the market value continues to get ever lower, thus sparking the risk of the mother of all margin calls: a veritable credit fission reaction.

But no matter what: the important thing to remember is that "they are all hedged" - or so they say, a claim we made a completely mockery of a few weeks back. So ex-sarcasm, the now parabolic increase in derivatives means that when the bilateral netting chain is once again broken, and it will be (because AIG was not a one off event), there will simply be trillions more in derivatives that no longer generate a booked cash flow stream for the remaining counterparty, until at the very end, the whole inverted credit0money pyramid collapses in on itself. 

Because once the whole bilateral netting chain is broken, net becomes gross. And gross market value becomes total notional outstanding. And, to quote Hudson, it's game over. 

Expect to see gross market value declines persisting even as the now parabolic increase in total notional persists. At this rate we would not be surprised to see one quadrillion in OTC derivatives by the middle of next year.

And, once again for those confused, the fact that notional had to increase so epically as market value tumbled most likely means that the global derivative pyramid scheme (no pun intended) is almost over.

   

To protect and serve the 1% and kick the crap out of everybody else

“If you want a vision of the future, imagine a boot stomping on a human face -- forever.” George Orwell, 1984

So disillusionment with the powers that be, anger and outrage at bailouts for banks and austerity for everyone else, disappointment with the lack of economic opportunity and excessive debt that can consequently never be paid back, are among the reasons that have led to the formation of the  #OWS (Occupy Wall Street) movement. After two months of peaceful protest and civil disobedience, the protesters have been attacked by the police in a concerted action across the country. Now, the police are obviously here to protect and serve the top one percent of the population that has most of the income and to kick the shit out of anybody else who dares to dissent or protest. Hyperbole, you say? Looking at the following pictures will make even the most law-abiding citizen cringe with disgust, disillusionment and despair. These emotions should quickly give way to outrage, anger and the determination to DO SOMETHING, anything, to fight not only against this level of crass brutality that is not to be accepted or tolerated, but against the corrupt, destructive finance driven junta that seems to have taken over the countries of the West, in what Simon Johnson called the quiet coup.

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Via the Oregonian:
Via @JATayler:
By Lauren Kelley | Sourced from AlterNet

vor 2 Tagen
vor 2 Tagen

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Photo Credit: Newsweek

More police violence against #occupy protesters here. .

Yves Smith: Debt Ceiling Extortion

Economists never learn: or "It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it."

Yves Smith of nakedcapitalism.com/ fame has another awesome post demolishing economists' dogma. In The Sorrow and the Pity of Economists (Like DeLong) Not Learning from Their Mistakes she takes apart an argument by one of the few economists who is actually willing to admit to mistakes, and is to be respected for that, but is unfortunately stuck in a world of models that have nothing to do with the real world and misrepresent what the founder of macroeconomics said anyway. 

Delong says: There is only one real law of economics: the law of supply and demand. If the quantity supplied goes up, the price goes down

Unfortunately for the discipline of economics this is not true: Steve Keen's lectures on behavioural finance are a great place to become disabused of the notion that there are any laws of economics and the lectures provide an enlightening and insightful introduction to a more realistic approach to economics and finance. 


But back to Yves: 

No, it’s NOT the law, it’s a belief and it often is not operative...DeLong then argues that he and presumably his colleagues ignored the notions of John Hicks, the English economist who formalized the idea of Keynes’ General Theory and turned it into a special case of neoclassical economics. Keynes himself repudiated it, as did Hicks in his eighties....

Why would Keynes not like this treatment? Keynes, himself a successful speculator, did not think financial markets had any propensity to equilibrium, and there is separately reason to think the equilibrium assumption that the discipline has embraced to make its mathematics “tractable” is bollocks. The equilibrium assumption (more accurately, ergodicity) makes it impossible to incorporate any phenomena that are destabilizing, such as ones with positive (self-reinforcing feedback loops. Yet as we discuss short form in ECONNED (and George Cooper gives an elegant layperson treatment in The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles, and the Efficient Market Fallacy), financial markets have no propensity to equilibrium. They are inherently prone to boom-bust cycles.

Even though Hicks’ story, via DeLong, bears some resemblance to Keynes’ liquidity preferences idea, it posits different causal channels that render them fundamentally different. In really simple terms, there is a “loanable funds” market in which borrowers and savers meet to determine the price of lending. Keynes argued that investors could have a change in liquidity preferences, which is econ-speak for they get freaked out and run for safe havens, which in his day was to pull it out of the banking system entirely. Hicks endeavored to show that the loanable funds and liquidity preferences theories were complementary, since he contended that Keynes ignored the bond market (loanable funds) while his predecessors ignored money markets.

But that’s a deliberate misreading. Keynes saw the driver as the change in the mood of capitalists; the shift in liquidity preferences was an effect. (In addition, Keynes held that changes with respect to existing portfolio positions, meaning stocks of held assets, would tend to swamp flow effects captured by loanable funds models.)

Making money cheaper is not going to make anyone want to take risk if they think the fundamental outlook is poor. Except for finance-intensive firms (which for the most part is limited to financial services industry incumbents), the cost of money is usually not the driver in business decisions, Market potential, the absolute level of commitment required, competitor dynamics and so on are what drive the decision; funding cost might be a brake. So the idea that making financing cheaper in and of itself is going to spur business activity is dubious, and it has been borne out in this crisis, where banks complain that the reason they are not lending is lack of demand from qualified borrowers. Surveys of small businesses, for instance, show that most have been pessimistic for quite some time.

If you want to put it in more technical terms, what is happening is a large and sustained fall in what Keynes called the marginal efficiency of capital. Companies are not reinvesting at a rate sufficient rate to sustain growth, let alone reduce unemployment. Rob Parenteau and I discussed the drivers of this phenomenon in a New York Times op-ed on the corporate savings glut last year: that managers and investors have short term incentives, and financial reform has done nothing to reverse them. Add to that that in a balance sheet recession, the private sector (both households and businesses) want to reduce debt, which is tantamount to saving. Lowering interest rates is not going to change that behavior. And if you try to generate inflation in this scenario, when individuals and companies are feeling stresses, all you do is reduce their real spending (and savings power) and further reduce demand (and hence economic activity).

So what Keynes thought important was to get investors to stop being "freaked out", decrease their liquidity preference, and again see the marginal efficiency of capital as sufficient to warrant further investment. 


Back to Yves: 

Marshall Auerback, by e-mail, points out that liquidity trap thinking is based on the idea that banks lend out of bank reserves. It has been shown empirically that banks lend first and reserve creation follows (that is, when needed, central banks accommodate loan creation):

The liquidity trap idea seems to be predicated on the silly idea that banks lend out reserves and failure to do so is symptomatic of a liquidity trap. But idea that the build up of bank reserves represent a pot of funds that the banks will eventually loan out completely misunderstands the role of bank reserves. But as Randy Wray, Bill Mitchell, Scott Fullwiler, Stephanie Kelton and a host of others have noted before banks do not loan out reserves. Reserves facilitate the payments system – that is, the system that assures the millions of transactions between banks (as customers write cheques and deposit them throughout the banking system).

Banks do not make loans on the basis of the reserves they hold. They respond to demands from credit-worthy customers and have in mind what it will cost them to make the loans under current conditions. When the transactions that follow the creation of a loan transpire it might be that the is short of reserves to ensure the payments clear. It has various options. It can seek funds from wholesale markets (other banks or other lenders), use deposits (not an overnight option really) or, ultimately, it can source the funds from the central bank.

The point is that you can get various levels of bank reserves depending on how the central bank pursues its liquidity management in order to hit its target policy rate. None of those levels have any particular operational significance.

The mainstream then argue that if the central bank mops up these reserves it will be less inflationary than if it leaves them in the system. This view is based on the spurious – banks lend reserves argument. The inflation risk associated with government spending is the same whether the government issues debt to match its deficit or not. The inflation risk arises from the impact of the spending on the state of capacity in the economy.

This is why fiscal stimulus is vastly more effective than monetary policy at times like these: it has a direct impact on overall conditions, by stimulating demand. Government spending creates more income for businesses and ultimately, consumers. Everyone’s income is ultimately someone else’s spending. If government increase spending, it will increase the incomes of at least some people in the economy, and the improvement in their fortunes (if they believe the new income level will be sustained) will lead them to spend more, improving the affairs of yet more people.

So the stimulation of demand is to be achieved by an improvement in overall conditions and this can best be done through fiscal policy, the aversion to which is not a matter of economics but ideology as pointed out by  Edward Harrison from creditwritedowns.

But the important point is that because his General Theory was unfortunately written in a manner that few could understand too well, the wrong lessons have been drawn from Keynes and propounded all these years. It is my contention that Keynes was not only the founder of macroeconomics, but also a behavioral economist, and his insights into the psychology of investors and the economy are invaluable and should be taken to heart. 


In my post on Hyman Minskys financial instability hypothesis there is a long quote from Keynes's 1937 article in the Quarterly Journal of economics, where he explained his views more clearly: 

Actually, however, we have, as a rule, only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct consequences of our acts. Sometimes we are not much concerned with their remoter consequences, even tho time and chance may make much of them. But sometimes we are intensely concerned with them, more so, occasionally, than with the immediate consequences.

Now of all human activities which are affected by this remoter preoccupation, it happens that one of the most important is economic in character, namely. Wealth. The whole object of the accumulation of Wealth is to produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders Wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which economic goods were necessarily consumed within a short interval of their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an important factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth-accumulation the more essential does such amendment become.

By "uncertain" knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealthowners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to he summed.

How do we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which saves our faces as rational, economic men? We have devised for the purpose a variety of techniques, of which much the most important are the three following:

(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto. In other words we largely ignore the prospect of future changes about the actual character of which we know nothing.

(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and until something new and relevant comes into the picture.

(3) Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. That is, we endeavor to conform with the behavior of the majority or the average. The psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is endeavoring to copy the others leads to what we may strictly term a conventional judgment.

Now a practical theory of the future based on these three principles has certain marked characteristics. In particular, being based on so flimsy a foundation, it is subject to sudden and violent changes. The practice of calmness and immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation. All these pretty, polite techniques, made for a well-panelled Board Room and a nicely regulated market, are liable to collapse. At all times the vague panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really lulled, and lie but a little way below the surface.

Perhaps the reader feels that this general, philosophical disquisition on the behavior of mankind is somewhat remote from the economic theory under discussion. But I think not. Tho this is how we behave in the market place, the theory we devise in the study of how we behave in the market place should not itself submit to market-place idols. I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future.

I daresay that a classical economist would readily admit this. But, even so, I think he has overlooked the precise nature of the difference which his abstraction makes between theory and practice, and the character of the fallacies into which he is likely to be led.

So this is the crux of Keynes's theory and even an ostensibly Keynesian economist such as Brad DeLong unfortunately fails to draw the correct lessons from the theory. As pointed out by Yves and many others who contribute to the current discussion of the dismal state of the dismal science, it is confidence and lack thereof that determines economic recovery or depression, and not the sacred cows of supply and demand.

But at the end of the day: "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!"      

ECONNED -– The Movie, Um, Video!

Awsome video from Yves Smith!

ECONNED – The Movie, Um, Video!
A very talented movie/commerical/trailer editor, who for some bizarre reason insists on going nameless (but if you want his coordinates, don’t hesitate to ping me) assisted by Ben Fisher in a major role (finding images and video clips) and Richard Smith in a minor role (extensive sanity checking) put this together.

This may inspire McLuhan-esque debates, since I wanted something true to the medium, as in visceral and immediate, rather than the usual talking head sort of piece.

Enjoy! Oh, and turn the sound up

Buy this book! Econned: How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted Capitalism

Make sure you get the upcoming book from my friend Yves Smith of www.nakedcapitalism.com fame.

Countdown 3/2/10: Excerpt from Econned
Folks, the time has come when I must start shamelessly promoting my book, Econned: How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted Capitalism, which is being released March 2, 2010.

I thought the extract below would give readers an idea of what the book is about, with one caveat. Econned goes into some detail about crisis mechanisms (as in why it got as bad as it did) and has unearthed a heretofore unexamined hedge fund trading strategy that turned the subprime mania into the detonator of the global debt bomb (and yes, we have the goods).

Enjoy!

In 1776, Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations. In it, he argued that the uncoordinated actions of large numbers of individuals, each acting out of self-interest, sometimes produced, as if by “an invisible hand,” results that were beneficial to broader society. Smith also pointed out that self-interested actions frequently led to injustice or even ruin. He fiercely criticized both how employers colluded with each other to keep wages low, as well as the “savage injustice” that European mercantilist interests had “commit[ted] with impunity” in colonies in Asia and the Americas.

Smith’s ideas were cherry-picked and turned into a simplistic ideology that now dominates university economics departments. This theory proclaims that the “invisible hand” ensures that economic self-interest will always lead to the best outcomes imaginable. It follows that any restrictions on the profit-seeking activities of individuals and corporations interfere with this invisible hand, and therefore are “inefficient” and nonsensical.

According to this line of thinking, individuals have perfect knowledge both of what they want and of everything happening in the world at large, and so they pass their lives making intelligent decisions. Prices may change in ways that appear random, but this randomness follows predictable, unchanging rules and is never violently chaotic. It is therefore possible for corporations to use clever techniques and systems to reduce or even eliminate the risks associated with their business. The result is a stable, productive economy that represents the apex of civilization.

This heartwarming picture airbrushes out nearly all of the real business world. Yet uncritical allegiance to these precepts over the last thirty years has produced a world in which corporations, especially in finance, are far less restricted in their pursuit of profit. We show in this book how this lawless environment has led the financial services industry to pursue its own unenlightened
self-interest. The industry has become systematically predatory. Employees of industry firms have not confined their predation to outsiders; their efforts to loot their own firms nearly destroyed the industry and the entire global economy. Similarly destructive behavior by other players, often viewed through a distorted lens that saw all unconstrained commercial behavior as virtuous, added more
fuel to the conflagration.

Some economists have opposed this prevailing ideology; indeed, comparatively new lines of inquiry focus explicitly on how economic actors can fool themselves or others into making poor, even destructive, choices.

But when the economics profession has used the megaphone of its authority to dominate discussions with policymakers and the public, it has spoken with one voice, and the message has been the one described here. We therefore confine our criticism to these particularly influential ideas.

Theories that fly in the face of reality often need to excise inconvenient phenomena, and mainstream economics is no exception. Idealizing the rational aspects of business decisions means refusing to notice behavior that is predatory, destructive, criminal, or simply stupid. Believing that risk is manageable through mechanical systems has required not just unrealistic assumptions but also willful
blindness to clear signs of danger.

We offer here another point of view. This book lays bare both the actions leading to the credit crisis and the economic constructs that defended, facilitated, and even exacerbated this behavior. Our case makes clear that if our economic system is to harness the self-interest of individuals to achieve the general
good, it must be supervised within a democratic society and responsive to criticism by outside voices of those who are unafraid to think independently.

Reflexivity in Action

Reflexivity in action. That is all.

The Precondition for an Economic Recovery According to Keynes and Confirmed by, of all People, Greenspan

Most of the blogosphere has been skeptical of the rally in equities since the beginning, with ZeroHedge pointing out that the rise can be attributed, basically, to free money courtesy of the Federal Reserve, and aided and abetted by High Frequency Trading and the principal program trading of the usual suspects. Now, even for those who are not conspiracy minded, charts such as these speak volumes(pun intended).

From ZeroHedge.

I would like to point out one possible explanation for this phenomenon from a contentious source that I have quoted before. I maintian that Keynes is misunderstoond by many and that he is not the source of all wisdom, but, rather, someone who asked the right questions at the right time and pointed out many problems in the workings of the economy in periods of turmoil.

Unfortunately a serious fall in the marginal efficiency of capital also tends to affect adversely the propensity to consume. For it involves a severe decline in the market value of Stock Exchange equities. Now, on the class who take an active interest in their Stock Exchange investments, especially if they are employing borrowed funds, this naturally exerts a very depressing influence. These people are, perhaps, even more influenced in their readiness to spend by rises and falls in the value of their investments than by the state of their incomes. With a "stock-minded" public as in the United States to-day, a rising stock-market may be an almost essential condition of a satisfactory propensity to consume; and this circumstance, generally overlooked until lately, obviously serves to aggravate still further the depressing effect of a decline in the marginal efficiency of capital.
When once the recovery has been started, the manner in which it feeds on itself and cumulates is obvious. But during the downward phase, when both fixed capital and stocks of materials are for the time being redundant and working-capital is being reduced, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital may fall so low that it can scarcely be corrected, so as to secure a satisfactory rate of new investment, by any practicable reduction in the rate of interest. Thus with markets organised and influenced as they are at present, the market estimation of the marginal efficiency of capital may suffer such enormously wide fluctuations that it cannot be sufficiently offset by corresponding fluctuations in the rate of interest. Moreover, the corresponding movements in the stock-market may, as we have seen above, depress the propensity to consume just when it is most needed. In conditions of laissez-faire the avoidance of wide fluctuations in employment may, therefore, prove impossible without a far-reaching change in the psychology of investment markets such as there is no reason to expect. I conclude that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands.

The point of contention is, and has been, the last sentence, which raises the blood pressure of everyone involved, on both sides, like nothing else ever written about economics (save maybe Marx). I am not venturing out on a limb when I say that the powers that be have read this passage and drawn their own conclusions from it. Even Greenspan said :

The rise in global stock prices from early March to mid-June is arguably the primary cause of the surprising positive turn in the economic environment. The $12,000bn of newly created corporate equity value has added significantly to the capital buffer that supports the debt issued by financial and non-financial companies. Corporate debt, as a consequence, has been upgraded and yields have fallen. Previously capital-strapped companies have been able to raise considerable debt and equity in recent months. Market fears of bank insolvency, particularly, have been assuaged

.
Juxtaposing these two quotes does not a proof of a government engineered market melt-up make, but one does have to wonder.

Robert Shiller on Inefficient Markets and Behavioral Finance

Robert Shiller is perhaps best known for his Case-Shiller home price index and for having correctly identified the previous bubble in financial markets in his 2000 book Irrational Exuberance . Shiller is concerned with risk and uncertainty in human affairs and has never been a proponent of the orthodoxy which either claims that bubbles do not exist(!) or that markets should be left to themselves since they instantly and efficiently incorporate all known information, something known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis .
Barry Ritholz discusses the hubris of economics in a must read post, and over at Washington´s Blog another great post points out that economists had a incentive to be wrong.
Now Robert Shiller´s criticism of prevailing economic orthodoxy may not be as acid but it is nevertheless a damning indictment. Below is his lecture on Behavioral Finance and a very informative article on the decline (one would hope) of the Efficient Markets Theory and the rise of Behavioral Finance.





From Efficient Market Theory to Behavioral Finance

Steve Keen on the economy: On the Edge with Max Keiser

Steve Keen is one of the few economists who predicted the financial crisis and he is not at all impressed with the government response arguing that texboox economics failed to predict the crisis and are also not going to solve the problems we are facing. His outlook is less than rosy to say the least.

Dilbert on the economy

Hyman Minsky´s Financial Instability Hypothesis

There is nothing like a crisis of momentous proportions to focus the mind. The intellectual edifice that was neo-classical economics came crumbling down last fall, something admitted by none other than the guru of efficient self-regulating markets himself, Alan Greenspan.



Now a well worn phrase has been that "no one could have seen this coming." Well, that is just not true; many did. And what set them apart from the cheering herd and its Panglossian view that all is for the best in this best of all worlds is that they did not drink from the neo-classical ideological kool-aid.

Hyman Minsky is about the last person asset managers would want to be mentioning in their letters to their clients (I cannot recall where I originally read this, or I would attribute credit). Minsky is perhaps best known for his Financial Instability Hypothesis which is being wonderfully articulated by Steve Keen at his debt deflation blog , along with the good folks over at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability and many others.

Why the resurgence in interest in Minsky? Well, he explained and expanded ideas set forth by Keynes, who did not believe that markets were efficient and self-regulating. The price of an asset was not always the correct price.

From Keynes´s article in 1937:

Actually, however, we have, as a rule, only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct consequences of our acts. Sometimes we are not much concerned with their remoter consequences, even tho time and chance may make much of them. But sometimes we are intensely concerned with them, more so, occasionally, than with the immediate consequences.

Now of all human activities which are affected by this remoter preoccupation, it happens that one of the most important is economic in character, namely. Wealth. The whole object of the accumulation of Wealth is to produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders Wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which economic goods were necessarily consumed within a short interval of their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an important factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth-accumulation the more essential does such amendment become.

By "uncertain" knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealthowners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as
practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to he summed.

How do we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which saves our faces as rational, economic men? We have devised for the purpose a variety of techniques, of which much the most important are the three following:

(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto. In other words we largely ignore the prospect of future changes about the actual character of which we know nothing.
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and until something new and relevant comes into the picture.
(3) Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. That is, we endeavor to conform with the behavior of the majority or the average. The psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is endeavoring to copy the others leads to what we may strictly term a conventional judgment.

Now a practical theory of the future based on these three principles has certain marked characteristics. In particular, being based on so flimsy a foundation, it is subject to sudden and violent changes. The practice of calmness and immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation. All these pretty, polite techniques, made for a well-panelled Board Room and a nicely regulated market, are liable to collapse. At all times the vague panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really lulled, and lie but a little way below the surface.

Perhaps the reader feels that this general, philosophical disquisition on the behavior of mankind is somewhat remote from the economic theory under discussion. But I think not. Tho this is how we behave in the market place, the theory we devise in the study of how we behave in the market place should not itself submit to market-place idols. I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the
future.

I daresay that a classical economist would readily admit this. But, even so, I think he has overlooked the precise nature of the difference which his abstraction makes between theory and practice, and the character of the fallacies into which he is likely to be led.

Keynes, John Maynard (1937). `The General Theory of Employment`, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 51. cited in Shaw, G.K. (198. The Keynesian Heritage: Volume I. pp.11-13

Minsky identified three types of finance: hedge, speculative and Ponzi. Once the Ponzi stage is reached, debt is taken on in the belief that asset prices will continue to rise which will enable the debt to be serviced. Needless to say, once asset prices start to fall many will default. This is what we are seeing now. From Wray and Tymoigne :

Minsky created a famous taxonomy of financing profiles undertaken by investing firms: hedge (prospective income flows are expected to cover interest and principle with a safe margin); speculative (near-term income flows will cover only interest, although it is expected that finance costs will fall, that income flows will rise, or that assets can be sold at a higher price later—in which case revenues will be sufficient to cover principle); and Ponzi (near-term receipts are insufficient to cover interest payments so that debt increases because the Ponzi unit borrows to cover interest payments). Over the course of an expansion, financial stances evolve from largely hedge to include ever rising proportions of speculative and even Ponzi positions. Some Ponzi positions are undertaken voluntarily (due, for example, to expectations that debt can be refinanced at much more favorable terms or that large capital gains can be realized from asset price appreciation), some are fraudulent (a “pyramid” scheme is an example, in which a crook dupes everlarger numbers of suckers to provide the funds to pay the earliest participants), and some result from disappointment (revenues are lower than expected or finance costs rise unexpectedly). Attempts to raise leverage and to move to more speculative positions can be frustrated at least temporarily: if results turn out to be more favorable than expected, an investor attempting to engage in speculative finance could remain hedge because incomes realized are greater than were anticipated. This is because as aggregate investment rises, it has a multiplier impact on effective demand that can raise sales beyond what had been expected. Later, Minsky explicitly incorporated the Kaleckian result that in the truncated model, aggregate profits equal investment plus the government’s deficit.7 Thus, in an investment boom, profits would be increasing along with investment, helping to validate expectations and encouraging even more investment. This added strength to his proposition that the fundamental instability in the capitalist economy is upward—toward a speculative frenzy (as investment generates profits), which breeds more investment.

Here is an in depth look at the work and ideas of Hyman Mynsky.



Macroeconomics Meets Hyman P. Minsky the Financial Theory of Investment

Banks make deals with debtors; something is better than nothing

The Washington Post reports today that many banks have taken to actually lowering the interest rate on credit card debt when someone becomes unable to pay and are also actually forgiving debt in some cases. Keeping in mind that the refusal to pay any further by the debtor in the previous post is probably not an isolated incident, it certainly does make sense to try working with people, thereby getting something instead of nothing.

As more Americans lose work, many are increasingly struggling to pay their credit card bills, forcing banks to do what they had been loath to do in the past: forgive some of the debt or modify it in the cardholders' favor.

Lenders are looking to restructure credit card accounts by lowering interest rates or minimum monthly payments for a specific period of time, waiving fees, or settling the debt by accepting less than what is owed.

Consumer advocacy groups, however, have pointed out that credit card firms have increased interest rates and cut lines of credit in the past year in anticipation of a new law limiting their practices.

"The card companies are giving with one hand but taking away from the other," said Ed Mierzwinski, consumer program director for U.S. PIRG, a consumer advocacy group. "The problem is the credit card companies are treating consumers randomly. A small number are getting helped. A larger number are being hurt."

Some will approach only customers who are delinquent. Some will reach out at the first signs of trouble. Experts said other factors that might be taken into consideration are income, debt loads and payment history.

And borrowers can pay a price if they're granted a modification. Forgiven debt could be taxable and can tarnish the borrower's credit report for up to seven years. If the bank reports to credit bureaus that it forced the borrower to close the account, that, too, could damage the credit history, jeopardizing chances for future loans. Finally, if a borrower has a lot of debt, a closed account could hurt a credit score. If the borrower has to give up his card, then a key figure used by lenders to determine creditworthiness -- the ratio of outstanding debt to available credit -- can soar, harming the credit score even further.

Also uncertain is how the new credit card law adopted by Congress in May will affect banks' ability to modify loans. The law, parts of which took effect last month, restricts card issuers' latitude to change rates and decide in what order to apply payments when different balances have different rates.

So it seems as if the banks´ strategy is to screw over people by first raising rates up to 30%, cutting credit lines, charging ourageous overdraft and other fees, and then, if people stop making payments, to do any and everything to salvage just a bit of scraps.

Consumer sentiment...

This guy pretty much sums it up just fine.

J.M.Keynes on Classical Economics

One cannot read the following excerpt from Keynes without being impressed and disturbed by the fact that the same reasons were and are being set forth in support of neo-classical economics even after their complete and utter failure to predict, explain or provide solutions for the current crisis.

The completeness of the Ricardian victory is something of a curiosity and a mystery. It must have been due to a complex of suitabilities in the doctrine to the environment into which it was projected. That it reached conclusions quite different from what the ordinary uninstructed person would expect, added, I suppose, to its intellectual prestige. That its teaching, translated into practice, was austere and often unpaltable, lent it virtue. That it was adapted to carry a vast and consistent logical superstructure, gave it beauty. That it could explain much social injustice and apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident in the scheme of progress, and the attempt to change such things as likely on the whole to do more harm than good, commended it to authority. That it afforded a measure of justification to the free activities of the individual capitalist, attracted it to the support of the dominant social forces behind authority.
But although the doctrine itself has remained unquestioned by orthodox economists up to a late date, its signal failure for purposes of scientific prediction has greatly impaired, in the course of time, the prestige of its practitioners. For professional economists...were apparently unmoved by the lack of correspondence between the results of their theory and the facts of observation;-a discrepancy which the ordinary man has not failed to observe, with the result of his growing unwillingness to accord economists that measure of respect which he gives to other groups of scientists whose theoretical results are confirmed by observation when they are applied to the facts.

John Maynard Keynes (1936)
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Chapter 3